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CUSTOl\1 AS A SOURCE OF ENGLISH LAW

E. K. Braybroolte,r.

W

HEN writers on jurisprudence assert that custom is a source of
law their primary meaning seems to be that in any given case
a course of conduct persisted in by all or most of the members of a
society engenders a rule of law enjoining the continuance of that course
of conduct. 1 This, for example, appears to be the burden of Dr. C. K.
Allen's discussion of custom in his Law in the Making. 2 He sums up
the operation of custom in this sphere by saying that "the thing done"
(semble, by all or most members of the community) becomes "the thing
which must be done" (i.e., the rule binding on all members of the community).3 Now, Dr. Allen progresses straight from the introductory
remarks whose purport is thus summarised to a statement of the generally accepted fact that the Common Law of England is, at least in
part, a customary law.4 The clear inference is that wherever in the
Year Books or the reports we find a decision based on custom, whether
local or general, that custom is applied as a binding rule of law whose
content and whose force are both derived from a constant uniformity
of conduct in the community or locality.5
,. Senior Lecturer in Law, Victoria University College, Wellington, New Zealand.-Ed.
Cf. the definitions of custom as a source of rules of International Law. "A customary
rule of international law is a usage which states, in their practice and relations with
other states, follow and obey so generally under the conviction that they must obey it that
there is a legal presumption that it is obligatory, and international law." BRIGGS, THE LAw
OF NATIONS 47 (1938). See also OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW, 7th ed. by Lauterpacht, 18 (1948); BRIERLY, THE LAw OF NATIONS 60 (1949).
2 Au.EN, LAw IN THE MAKING, 3d ed., 62-66 (1939).
3 Id. at 96. Cf. Glyn, C. J., in Yates' Case (Protector v. Kingston-on-Thames Town),
Sty. 477 at 480, 82 Eng. Rep. 876 (1655): "All customs imply two things, to wit, a thing
possible to be done, and that the thing hath sometimes been done .•••" See SALMOND,
JURISPRUDENCE, 10th ed. by Glanville Williams, 31 (1947) where customary law is defined as "any rule which is the expression of some actual uniformity of voluntary action."
4 Citing in support POLLOCK, A FmST BooK OF JURISPRUDENCE, 6th ed., 254 (1929):
"The Common Law is a customary law if, in the course of about six centuries, the undoubting belief and uniform language of everybody who had occasion to consider the matter
were able to make it so. To this day 'coutume' is the nearest equivalent that learned Frenchmen can find for its English name." 1 CoKE, lNsTITUTEs 110b (1832): "Consuetudo is
one of the maine triangles of the !awes of England" and 1 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES,
Wendell ed., 67 (1854): "This unwritten or common law is properly distinguishable into
three kinds: 1. General customs; which are the universal rule of the whole kingdom, and
form the common law, in its stricter and more usual signification. 2. Particular customs;
which for the most part affect only the inhabitants of particular districts. 3. Certain particular laws; which by custom are adopted and used by some particular courts, of pretty general
and extensive jurisdiction."
5 Dr. Allen himself [LAW IN THE MAKING, 3d ed., 146 (1939) Excursus A], answering
Professor John Dewey's criticism [28 Cot. L. REv. 832 (1928)] that" ••• something happens
1

72

MrcmGAN LAw REvmw

[ Vol. 50

Certainly an impressive array of quotations may be mustered to
support this view of English law. If we go to the law books, there is,
for example, Bracton. He tells us 6 that the unwritten law (by which
he seems to mean what would later be called the "general custom of the
realm," distinguishing it thereby from custom in the sense of local
customs) is that "quad usus comprobavit";7 and that in the place where
the local customs obtain "semper inquirendum erit, quae sint illius loci
consuetudo, et qualiter utantur consuetudine qui consuetudines allegant." Coke, in the passage cited by Dr. Allen8 says that "of every
custome there be two essentiall parts, time and usage; Time out of
minde. . . . and continuall and peaceable usage without lawfull interruption." Blackstone9 says of the leges non scriptae (under which
heading he includes both general and particular customs) that "they
receive their binding power, and the force of laws, by long and
immemorial usage, and by their universal reception throughout the
kingdom."10 He repeats this a little later: 11 " ••• in our law the goodness
of a custom depends upon its having been used time out of mind; or in
the solemnity of our legal phrase, time whereof the memory of man
runneth not to the contrary. This it is that gives it its weight and
authority." Although Salmond12 describes Blackstone's account of the
origin of the law of England as "an echo of the past, not an accurate
account of the facts of the present day," he adds, "Nevertheless, even
now custom has not wholly lost its law-creating efficacy. It is still to be
accounted one of the legal sources of the law of England...."
Similar language may be found in the Law Reports. We are told
by the reporter of the Case of T anistry,1 3 for example, that custom is
when a custom becomes a law, and •.. I do not find in Mr. Allen a clear statement of just
what this something is," says (at 147), "I do not think it is open to reasonable doubt that
when a Court accepts and applies a custom, it does so not in the belief that it is introducing
a new rule into the law, but in the belief that it is declaring and applying what is already
the law."
6 DB LBGmus I, I, s. 2 (1569).
7 Although he does not say specifically -whose usage furnishes this approval, and adds
the cautious qualification " ••• sed absurdum non erit leges Anglicanas (licet non scriptas)
leges appellare, cum legis vigorem habeat, quicquid de consilio et consensu magnatum, et
republicae communi sponsione, auctoritate regis sive principis praecedente, iuste fuerit definitum et approbatum." (Ch. I, s. 2.)
s I CoXll, lNsTITUTBS 110b (1832).
9 I CoMMBNTARIBs, 15th ed., 64 (1809).
10 Blackstone seems to have forgotten at this point that in terms of his previous definition of leges non scriptae he is also speaking of local and particular customs.
111 CoMMBNTAlUBs, 15th ed., 67 (1809).
12 JmusPRUDBNcB, 10th ed. by Glanville Williams 201 (1947).
18 Davis Rep. (Ir.) 28, 80 Eng. Rep. 516 (1608).
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made by the people of the place where it obtains: they find some manner
of acting good and beneficial, and they use and practise it from time to
time; and the custom is made "by the frequent iteration and multiplication of this act."14 This definition, which Dr. Allen refers to as one
of the standard definitions of custom,1 5 has been repeatedly cited and
approved in later cases.16 Again, Cozens-Hardy, M. R., refers in Bebb
v. Law Society1 7 to "that long uniform and uninterrupted usage which
is the foundation of the greater part of the common law of this country."
It is perhaps small wonder, in the light of the continuous line of
statements such as these, and less detailed. assertions throughout the
Year Books and the Law Reports that the common law itself is no other
than the common custom of the realm,18 that we should believe implicitly that most of the rules of English law are customary rules. But
if we look closely at that statement, can we really accept all the implications? Remembering the definition of custom set out at the beginning
of this paper, can we really assert that a major part of our law has its
roots in popular custom?
To find an adequate answer to this question, we will have to remember that the thread of custom that goes into the making of the
"seamless web" of English law can be separated into four distinct
strands. Two have already been mentioned; the general custom of the
14 Id.

at 32-33. " ... custome, in lentendment del ley, est tiel usage que ad obtaine

vim legis, & est revera un binding ley al tiel particular lieu, persons & choses que ceo concern: & tiel custome ne poet estre establish per grant del roy, 49 Ed. 3, 3, a. ne p. Act de
Parliament. Mes est jus non scriptum, & fait per le people tantum de tiel lieu ou le custome curge. Car lou le people trove ascun act destre bon & beneficial, & apt & agreeable
a lour nature & disposition, ils usont & practisont ceo de temps en temps; & issint per
frequent iteration & multiplication de cest act, Custome est fait; & esteant use de temps dont

memorie ne court, obtaine le force de un ley. • • • Et issint briefement, custome est un reasonable act, iterated, multiplied & continued per le people, de temps dont memory ne court."
15 LAW IN THE MilING, 3d ed., 64, n. 2 (1939).
16 E.g. by Tindal, C. J., in Tyson v. Smith, 9 Ad. & EI. 406 at 421, 112 Eng. Rep.
1265 (1838).
17 [1914] l Ch. 286 at 294. Cf. Lord Lorebum, L.C., in Nairn v. University of St.
Andrews, [1909] A.C. 147 at 160: "Only the clearest proof that a different state of
things prevailed in ancient times could be entertained by a Court of Law in probing the
origin of so inveterate an usage. I need not remind your Lordships that numberless rights
rest upon a similar basis. Indeed, the whole body of the common law has no other foundation."
18 See e.g. l BRooKE, AliRIDGEllll!NT (1573), tit. Customes, pl. 23, citing 7 H. VI, c.
31, 32; pl. 59, citing 34 H. Vill; Y.B. 2 Hy. IV Pasch. pl. 5, cited in 3 HoLDSWORTH, A
HISTORY oF ENGLISH LAW 386, n. 3 (1923); Veley v. Burder, 12 Ad. & El. 265, 301, 113
Eng. Rep. 813 (1841); Ball v. Herbert, 3 T.R. 253, 260, 100 Eng. Rep. 560 (1789); Nunn
v. Varty, 3 Curt. 352, 362-3, 163 Eng. Rep. 754, (1843); Pozzi v. Shipton, 8 Ad. & El.
963, 974-5, 112 Eng. Rep. 1106 (1838); Nairn v. University of St. Andrews, [1909] A.C.
147.
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realm and the local or particular customs. Two others may also be distinguished: borough customs and mercantile custom. Each of these
will have to be scrutinised in tum if a consistent theory of the role of
custom in English law is to be built up.
So far as the general custom of the realm is concerned, doubts have
already been expressed whether it is solely or even substantially founded
on popular custom.19 And if we examine some of the evidence which
is cited by, for example, Mr. Greer20 in support of "a very strong presumption that the Common Law originated in the judicial adoption of
the common customs of the realm"21 we will see that such doubts are
well founded. Take for example the plea that the man who so negligently looks after his house that it catches fire and the fire spreads to his
neighbour's house is liable by "the law and custom of the realm."22
What sort of custom is this? Is the plea that it is customary for every
man so to look after his own property that fires do not arise and spread
therefrom? Or is the. plea that in such circumstances the custom is to
hold the man concerned liable in damages? Surely the latter; and surely
then the custom is that of the courts rather than popular custom. Again,
take the law as to common carriers and innkeepers. We are told that
this is founded on the custom of the realm. 23 But what is the nature of
this custom? Have the common carriers and innkeepers themselves,
from "time whereof the memory of man runneth not to the contrary"
freely indemnified their customers against the loss of goods entrusted
to them, in circumstances in which the ordinary man in the street, from
absence of negligence, would not be considered liable? To assert this
would be to expect too much of human nature. Or are we to postulate
an overwhelming demand from the public whose goods are put into
the custody of carriers or innkeepers that these two classes of men must
in every case stand the risk of loss? If we do, do we not stretch the
definition of custom beyond the sense of an habitual manner of acting,
19 See e.g. Brown, "Customary Law in Modem England," 5 CoL. L. REv. 561
(1905) especially at 564: ''There is the custom of a people or class; there is the custom of
the courts." Au.EN, LAWIN THE MAx!NG, 3d ed., 120-121 (1939); PoLLOCK, A FmST Boo:s:
oF JumsPRUDENCE, 2d ed., 249-252 (1904) and especially at 253: " ••• the Common Law
rapidly became a specialised branch of learning worked out by rule. • • • much of the
usage which determined its form was, by the nature of the case, professional and official
usage."
20 Greer, "Custom in the Common Law," 9 L. Q. REv. 153, 157-160 (1893).
2lld. at 160.
22 Id. at 157, citing Y.B. 2 H. IV, pl. 18.
23 Pozzi v. Shipton, 8 Ad. & EI. 963, 112 Eng. Rep. 1106 (1838); Nugent v. Smith, l
C.P.D. 19, 23 (1875).
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in certain defined circumstances, which creates a legal rule prescribing
the continuance of this manner of acting in such circumstances? Again,
we are driven to say that the only custom in that sense which is available
to create the rule of law referred to is the custom of the courts, which
binds them to continue to grant the remedies in question. 24 But to
acknowledge this is surely to pervert the generally-accepted meaning of
the phrase "customary law." When that phrase is used the inference
is that the custom is popular custom; and as has already been observed
the standard definitions of custom in English law clearly contemplate
that its foundation is in popular action. 25
If we turn to the forms of writs set out by Fitzherbert,26 another
common source of the phrases "custom of the realm" and "law and
custom of the realrn," 27 we find that if these phrases are intended to refer
to the result of law-creating customary action it is not to popular custom
but rather to the custom of the courts, or sometimes to mere official as
distinct from judicial custom. The rules ascribed to this source may be
substantive rules concerning the remedy to .be given28 or they may be
mere procedural rules governing such matters as pleading.29 The
sheriff is directed in certain matters to act according to "the custom of
24 Cf. the remarks of Brett, J., in Nugent v. Smith, 1 C.P.D. 19 at 30 (1875), where,
after discussing the rules of Roman Law as to nautae, caupones et stabularii, he points out
that "It required .•• authority, customary and thence judicial, or parliamentary, to introduce into the common law [this rule] •••" and he conjectures that " .•• the English judges,
acting at first no doubt on the general understanding of all merchants and ship-owners,
adopted into the common law the [rule] of the Roman law••••" "Afterwards, according
to the ordinary course of English law, the judges would have to consider whether some
other trade or business was not to be in England introduced into the [rule], because such
trade was so carried on as to be within the principle of the [rule]. They found a trade established in England, viz. the trade of 'common carriers,' which was so carried on, by reason
of the state of the country, as to be within the principle or conditions of the [rule], and
therefore they added that trade to those already within the exception." But notice that
Cockburn, C. J., differed strongly from the view that these rules of English law were derived from Roman law (p. 428).
25 There are to be found in the books, however, cases which clearly refer to the customs
of an inferior court; see e.g. Kimersly v. Cooper, Cro. Eliz. 168, 78 Eng. Rep. 426 (1589);
Grice v. Chambers, Cro. Eliz. 894, 78 Eng. Rep. 1118 (1601); Tredymmock v. Perryman,
Cro. Car. 259, 79 Eng. Rep. 826 (1632); Aike & Eamon v. Hunkin, 1 Sid. 233, 82 Eng.
Rep. 1077 (1664); and generally the cases collected in 7 VINER, ABRIDGEMENT, tit. Customs,
], 2, 190-192.
26References are to FrnHERBERT, NEw NATURA BREVIUM, 9th ed. (1794).
27 Cited by Greer, "Custom in The Common Law," 9 L. Q. REv. 153 (1893), as furnishing further evidence of the customary foundation of the Common Law.
28 See the writ de Partitione facienda, p. 61 R; the writ of covenant to levy a fine, pp.
146 G, 147 C.
29 See the writ de recordari, p. 70 B: Cf. in this connection the phrase recorded by the
learned editor of Y. B. 32 and 33 Ed. I, Rolls Series, at xxxiii of the introduction, called from
some anonymous tract: " ••• quia consuetudo regni Angliae talis est, quod placita coram Justiciariis per narratores in Romanis verbis et non in Latinis pronunciantur••••"
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England."3 ° Certain exemptions from attendance at courts or from
liability to office are ascribed to customs which, if they are truly
customary, can only be official and not popular in origin.31 Indeed, by
the time we haye tabulated the bewildering variety of references to "the
law and custom of the realm" (or "the custom of the realm" simpliciter)
to be found in the writs set out by Fitzherbert we are driven to the
conclusion that, as used by the clerks who composed these writs, the
phrases were intended to refer to nothing more than that part of English
law which was not clearly referable to statute32 and implied no other
theory as to the origin of the rules of law so described.
Any attempt to build a theory of the popular origin of the Common
Law from an analysis of the writs in which the above phrases are used,
or of the scanty number of cases in which the common custom of the
realm is pleaded, must therefore be based on little more than conjecture.
One case only has been found which seems to trace for us the history of
a customary rule of law which may genuinely stem from popular
custom-Veley 11. Burder.83 Whence came the rule of English law,
running counter to the general law of the Continent in matters ecclesiastical, that, while the incumbent of a parish remains responsible for the
repairs to the chancel, the parishioners are responsible for repairs to the
nave? The antiquarian researches of Mr. Follett, of counsel for the
appellant,34 indicated that the obligation is traceable to a statement in
the laws of Canute,35 which are commonly regarded as being merely
declaratory of pre-existing custom;36 and it is entirely possible that the
common zeal of parishioners all over the country, in years prior to
Canute's statement of the law, had consistently undertaken to relieve the
30 See the writs de excommunicato capiendo, p. 62 N; de cautione ad~ittenda, 63 C; de
replegiare de averiis, p. 68 D.
31 See the writ de non ponendis in assisis et juratis, p. 165 A, and that quod clerici
non eligantur in officio ballivi, p. 175 B.
32 Cf. the writ de recto de custodia terrae et haeredis, p. 141, which speaks of the
tender of a competent marriage "according to the form of the statute thereof provided by the
common council of our realm."
3312 Ad. & EI. 265, 113 Eng. Rep. 813 (1841).
34 Id. at 291-292.
35 See II Canute 65 s. 1 [RoBERTSON, THE LAws OI' THE KINGS OI' ENGLAND 207
(1925)]: "The whole nation, in accordance with the law, shall assist in the repair of
churches"; also LmBERMANN, I GEsETZE DER ANGELSACHSEN 352-353 (1903).
36 See e.g. STUBBS, CoNSTITUTIONAL HisTORY OI' ENGLAND 194 (1874): "The codes
[of Ethelred and Canute] are in fact not so much the introductions of new principles as
the declarations of the customs or common law of the race, dating from far beyond the existence of written record, preserved in the memories of the wise, and kept alive for the most
part in constant general experience." Cf. I PoLLOCK AND MAITLAND, H1sTORY OI' ENGLISH
LAw 2 (1895); 2 HoLDswoRTH, A HisTORY ol' ENGLISH LAw 19-21 (1923).
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incumbent of a portion of his burden and had thus created a truly
customary rule of law. But only further antiquarian research, beyond
the scope of this paper, could establish this with any certainty. 37 , 38
If we tum to a consideration of the local customs, which Blackstone
regards, equally with general customs, as founding the common law,
we confront a similar difficulty. Out of the bewildering variety of
customs which have been adjudicated upon we find few which seem
clearly to have their sole origin in popular action, so that "the thing
done" has become "the thing which must be done." 39 The custom
successfully pleaded in Harbin 17. Green40-that inhabitants of S.
tenants of the Bishop of S. were bound (inter alia) to have all grain
spent in their houses ground at the Bishop's mills-might be assigned
to this origin;41 but1 as will be shown later, other considerations influenced the court's decision. 42 The custom alleged in Naylor 17. Scott43that 10d was paid within a parish for churching women after childbirth
at the time of churching them or the usual time when they should be
churched-might equally be conjectured to have its origin in popular
action; but in this case the custom was held void for uncertainty. A
similar origin might be conjectured for the custom upheld in Burton 17.
Wileday44-a custom within a parish to make a general rate to reimburse the churchwardens their expenses, and for the inhabitants of
Athelstane to raise two-thirds and the inhabitants of three other vills to
raise the other third. Indeed, it is said arguendo that "every custom
implies a consent of the persons concerned for their mutual convenience" and that the custom must be presumed to commence by the
consent of the parishioners.45
37 In any case, it is arguable that for later periods in the history of our law the rule
derived its binding force from Canute's promulgation. But this raises further questions, as
to the effect of subsequent continuous usage in accordance with the rule, which are best
dealt with later.
38 In Blundell v. Catterall, 5 Barn. & Ald. 268, 106 Eng. Rep. 1190 (1821), the attempt
of Best, C. J., to base a common right of user of the seashore on immemorial popular custom
(of which he was clearly willing to take juclicial notice) was rather roughly handled by his
fellow judges, who preferred to uphold rights of private property even against a presumed
immemorial custom.
39 .ALLEN, LAw IN nm MAKING, 3d ed., 96 (1939).
40 Hob. 189, 80 Eng. Rep. 336 (1616).
41 Cf. a similar custom in Hix v. Gardiner, 2 Bulst. 195, 80 Eng. Rep. 1062 (1614).
42 Infra note 61.
432 Ld. Raym. 1558, 92 Eng. Rep. 510 (1729), sub. nom. Taylor v. Scott, Fitzg. 55,
94 Eng. Rep. 651 (1724).
44 Andr. 32(1737).
45 Id. at 37. But this is at variance with the theories which assert that the consent of
the parishioners (or other persons whose rights are involved) is given by their conduct. The
usage seems to be thought of as merely evidence of express consent.
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But examples such as these are few and far between: and if the great
majority of local customs can be said to acquire their legal force from
usage, because they represent "the thing done," then we must say that
"the thing done" has become "the thing which may be done." A large
proportion of the customs which have been pleaded through the years,
successfully and unsuccessfully, have involved the claim by residents of
a particular locality to exercise by custom certain rights over a certain
piece of land within that locality;46 rights which, while often similar to
those claimed by prescription, are outside the scope of prescriptive claim
because there is no certain person or persons in whom they may be
alleged. 47 But customary rights of this kind, like rights claimed by
prescription, all go to restrict the owner of the land affected in the
enjoyment of that land which is secured to him by his common law
rights thereover. Two alternative theories of the law-creating effect of
such customs are possible. On one theory, the customary rights, arising
46 E.g., that the inhabitants upon a common have used time out of mind to dig clay in
the lord's common, Stile v. Butts, Cro. Eliz. 434, 78 Eng. Rep. 675 (1594); that inhabitants
of a parish may have a churchway or marketway through the demesne of a manor which
is within the parish, Brocklebank v. Thompson, [1903] 2 Ch. 344; that freemen of a
borough being proprietors of ships may dig gravel from a "common shoar" (scil. the property
of the borough) for ballast of ships, Mayor and Commonalty of Linn-Regis v. Taylor, 3
Lev. 160, 83 Eng. Rep. 629(1684); that inhabitants of a defined area may have rights to
enter one particular piece of land in that area for recreational purposes, Abbot v. Weekly,
1 Lev. 176, 83 Eng. Rep. 357 (1665); Hall v. Nottingham, 1 Ex. D. 1 (1875); cf. Sowerby
v. Coleman, L. R. 2 Exch. 96 (1867); Mounsey v. Ismay, 1 H. & C. 729, 158 Eng. Rep.
1077 (1863); Edwards v. Jenkins, [1896] 1 Ch. 308; Lancashire v. Hunt, 10 T.L.R. 448
(1894); that fishermen in a particular district may enter and dry their nets upon the land
of another, 1 BROOKE, ABRIDGEMENT (1573), tit. Customes, pl. 46, citing 8 E. IV, 18, 19;
Mercer v. Denne, [1905] 2 Ch. 538; that tenants may set up stalls in a certain close within
the manor to sell their goods, Chafin v. Betsworth, 3 Lev. 190, 83 Eng. Rep. 644 (1684); cf.
the extension of such a right to all victuallers, Tyson v. Smith, 9 Ad. & El. 406, 112 Eng.
Rep. 1265 (1838); Elwood v. Bullock, 6 Q.B. 383, 115 Eng. Rep. 147 (1844); that inhabitants within a township might take water from a well or spring within one close in that
township, Race v. Ward, 4 El. & Bl. 702, 119 Eng. Rep. 259 (1855); cf. Harrop v. Hirst,
L.R. 4 Exch. 43 (1868). See also the customs alleged in Fitzhardinge v. Purcell, [1908] 2
Ch. 139; Bell v. Wardell, Will. 202, 125 Eng. Rep. 1131 (1740); Hough v. Clark and Hall,
23 T.L.R. 682 (1907); Earl of Coventry v. Willes, 3 New Rep. 119 (1863); Fitch v. Rawling, 2 H. Bl. 393, 126 Eng. Rep. 614 (1795); Bourke v. Davis, 44 Ch. D. 110 (1889);
Selby v. Robinson, 2 T.R. 758, 100 Eng. Rep. 409 (1788).
47 See 2 BROOKE, ABRIDGEMENT (1573), tit. Prescription, pl. 100, citing 2 M. I: "custom poet estre allege ou est nul person que poet prescriber, comme inhabitants ne poet prescriber, mes ils poent allege custome•..." Coke, C.J., in Rowles v. Mason, 2 Brown!. &
Golds. 192 at 198 (1612): "prescription is for one man, and custom is for many, if all but
one be not dead.••." Farwell, J., in Mercer v. Denne, [1904] 2 Ch. 534 at 556: "the
difference between custom and prescription [is] . . . that the right to the former must be
claimed by or in respect of a locality, and to the latter by a person or corporation...." Cf.
Ld. Mansfield, C.J., in Clarkson v. Woodhouse, 5 T.R. 412, note, 101 Eng. Rep.
231 (1782): " ••• when the claim depends on a general rule of property within certain
limits, it is alleged as a custom, or lex loci." (italics supplied).
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from popular action (e.g., the constant practice of dancing, of playing
sports, of digging gravel) go back to a time before there was any private
property in the locus in quo; therefore, independently of his own
volition, the first person in whom the land was vested took it as already
subject to the customary rights. 48 On the other theory, the customary
rights have arisen as an encroachment on rights of property already
existing. On any view of the history of English law, the first theory
seems difficult to maintain as a general theory of the origin of such
customs and of their force as law. Indeed, so far as the general custom
of passing and repassing over the foreshore is concerned (and that .
custom, one would suppose from the nature of things, must be coeval
with man's inhabitancy of the British Isles) the theory seems to have
been decisively rejected by the majority judgments in Blundell 11.
Catterall. 49 But if we are cast back on the second theory we must surely
suppose not only the usage of the beneficiaries and their predecessors,
in doing the act now claimed as permissible by customary right, but also
some acquiescence, tacit or express, in the owner of the property affected.
In fact it may be asserted with some confidence that this is the view
taken by English law; more, the presumed acquiescence of the owner,
or the person or persons burdened by the exercise of the alleged custom,
is seen as being of importance at least equal to that of the usage by the
beneficiaries, which tends to assume a merely evidential role.
We may first refer to the numerous cases -in which the custom
pleaded is one which establishes rights of a copyhold tenant against the
lord of the manor.50 In spite of the dictum te the contrary of Viscount
Maugham, L.C., in Wolstanton, Ltd. and Duchy of Lancaster 17. Newcastle-under-Lyme Borough Council, 51 all the judgments in Salisbury
(Marquis of) 17. Gladstone52 proceed on the footing that usage in these
48 Cf. Ld. Esher, M.R., in Attorney-General v. Wright, [1897] 2 Q.B. 318 at 321:
''I think such a matter is not to be traced to a grant by the sovereign or the owner of the soil,
but that it is a right by the law of England, a public right in every one navigating in
navigable waters. If so, the owner of the soil took his rights to the soil subject to those
general rights."
49 5 Barn. & Ald. 268, 106 Eng. Rep. 1190 (1821).
150 There are a very great number of these in the books; but in many instances the
reports do not specifically disclose that the tenants claiming are copyholders, though we
may infer from Gateward's Case, 6 Co. Rep. 59b, 77 Eng. Rep. 344 (1607), that pleaders
must specifically claim certain types of right for copyholders, and not for tenants or inhabitants generally. For modem instances of specific claims, see Tilbury v. Silva, 45 Ch. D. 98
(1890); Payne v. Ecclesiastical Commissioners, 30 T .L.R. 167 (1913); Wolstanton, Ltd. and
Duchy of Lancaster v. Newcastle-under-Lyme Borough Council, (1940] 3 All. E.R. 101.
51 (1940] 3 All E.R. 101 at II0.
52 9 H.L.C. 692, II Eng. Rep. 900 (1861).
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cases must be such that- a grant from the lord can be presumed, and
that such a grant is, in fact, very likely to have been made.53 True, we
may say, with Viscount Maugham, " ... I do not think that we are
called upon to accept the historical views of noble Lords in that year
[1861],"54 and that therefore we should be wary of accepting so simple
an explanation of the origin of copyhold tenure and its varying incidents
from manor to manor. Indeed, the modern researches into the origin of
copyhold estates, which were referred to in general terms by the learned
-Viscount, appear to establish that in numerous instances copyhold
customs (such as rights of common) are genuinely referable to the
·customs of the free cultivators of the original local community, a true
lex loci to which the overlord's acquisition of the manor was made
subject.55 But the historical records available to us do not appear to be
sufficient to enable us to assert dogmatically that this is true of all
manors, or even to say of which of the manors whose customs have
been put in suit it is true. At the most we may say, with the late Sir
Frederick Pollock: 56
"... that rights of common and all similar rights are derived
either from the ancient use and enjoyment of undivided common
land under the customary regulations imposed by the township to
' which the land belonged, or from use and enjoyment really granted
by lords to their inferior tenants in imitation of the ancient
customs."
This doctrine of a consensual origin of customary rules may be wide
of the mark historically when applied to customs governing the rights
53 See e.g. Ld. Cranworth at p. 701: "That relation [i.e. between a lord and his copy. holder] must have had its origin in remote times by agreement between the lord as absolute
owner of the whole manor in fee simple, and those whom he was content to allow to occupy
portions of it as his tenants at will. The rights of those tenants must have depended, in their
origin, entirely on the will of the lord. . . . In truth, I believe, that when it is said that a
custom is void because it is unreasonable, nothing more is meant than that the unreasonable character of the alleged custom conclusively proves that the usage, even though it may
have existed inunemorially, must have resulted from accident or indulgence, and not from
any right conferred in ancient times on the p_arty setting up the custom.'' To the same
effect Ld. Wensleydale at 704-705: " •.• It is a condition required by law, that the custom
should not be unreasonable; otherwise the prevalence of the use is to be referred to the ignorance or carelessness of those whose property is affected by its exercise, rather than to a
grant.'' Cf. also Ld. Chelmsford at 706 and 709-710.
54 Wolstanton, Ltd. and Duchy of Lancaster v. Newcastle-under-Lyme-Borough Council
[1940] 3 All E.R. 101 at 106.
55 E.g. 2 HoLDSWORTH, A HrsTORY OF ENGusH LAw 378-381 (1923); 3 id. 198 sqq.;
·491 sqq.; 7 id. 297-298, and references quoted therein; VrNOGRADOFF, VILLAINAGE IN
ENGLAND (1892) passim. Cheshire's suggestion [MODERN REAL PROPERTY, 5th ed., 23
(1944)] that all copyhold arose in this way seems to be too sweeping. See also POLLOCK,
THE 1.AND LAws 39-50 (1883).
56 POLLOCK, THE LAND LAWS 42 (1883).
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of copyhold tenants vis-a-vis the lord of the manor, or vice versa. But it
is only one manifestation of a search for some basis of the binding force
of our so-called "customary law" more acceptable or more plausible to
the practical lawyer that the doctrine of the tacitus consensus utentium.
The origins of the rule may, as in the cases just discussed, be sought in
some grant from the lord (even when the grantees are clearly not
thought of as copyhold tenants) or perhaps even from the Crown;57
some regulation made by a competent person may be postulated,58 or
even a lost Act of Parliament;50 but some legal origin over and above
the mere usage is clearly required to be presumed or presumable. 60
Again, in numerous cases the attempt by the lord of the manor to assert
in the courts customary rights as against his tenants has been checked
by the application of a not dissimilar test-that there must be some
consideration to support the custom. 61 We may agree with Dr. Allen's
57 A. L. Smith, L.J., says in Attorney-General v. Wright, [1897] 2 Q. B. 318 at 324
(a case involving the right of all persons navigating particular waters to use the foreshore
for fixed moorings): "It has been held over and over again ••. that it is the duty of the
Court when they find a user such as this, an uninterrupted and immemorial user of an incident like this, to find if possible a legal origin for it. In the present case this duty is
satisfied either by presuming a grant from the Crown in the manner which I have described, or a grant from the lord of the manor. • • ."
58 See Shoubridge v. Clark, 12 C.B. 335, 138 Eng. Rep. 934 (1852).
59 See Best, C.J., in Lord Falmouth v. George, 5 Bing. 286 at 293, 130 Eng. Rep.
1071 (1828); Coke, C.J., in Hill v. Hanks, 2 Bui st. 201 at 206, 80 Eng. Rep. 1066 (1614).
Treby, C.J. in Weekly v. Wildman, 1 Ld. Raym. 405 at 407, 91 Eng. Rep. 1169 (1698)
points out that such a presumption should not be made as of course; the custom must also of
itself be reasonable.
60 See Lord Selbome, L.C., in Goodman v. Borough of Saltash, 7 App. Cas. 633 (1882)
at 639-640: ''But an open and uninterrupted enjoyment from time immemorial under a
claim of right seems to me to be all that is necessary for a presumption that it had such
an origin as would establish the right, if a lawful origin was reasonably possible in law.
That in such a case a lawful origin ought to be presumed, if it is reasonably possible, is
established by many authorities, among which I think it sufficient to mention Cock.sedge 11.
Fanshawe, [1 Doug}. 119, 99 Eng. Rep. 80 (1779)] ••.•" See also Tindal, C.J. in Tyson
v. Smith, 9 Ad. & El. 406 at 421, 112 Eng. Rep. 1265 (1838); Heath, J. in Fitch v. Rawling, 2 H. Bl. 393 at 399, 126 Eng. Rep. 614 (I 795). And see the interesting discussion in
the Exchequer Chamber in the case of Simon Eyre, 35 H. VI, HEMMANT, SELECT CASES
IN THE ExCHEQUER CHAMBER (51 Selden Society) 114-129 (1933), especially Billyng at
120, Laken at 121, Nedeham at 124, Boeffe at 125, Danvers at 126; all these judges emphasise the possibility that the custom in question may have had a lawful beginning.
61 See e.g. Harbin v. Green, Hob. 189, 80 Eng. Rep. 336 (1616) in which the custom
as pleaded was that the inhabitants of the city of S. in an ancient house holden of the
bishop, have used to have all their grain spent and sold within the city ground at the said
mills, &c, in consideration whereof the said bishops have used to keep servants to grind and
loaders to carry &c. Both sides, it was held, were bound by the custom. See also Geere v.
Burkenshaw, 3 Lev. 85, 83 Eng. Rep. 589 (1683), in which a custom that if any ship
came ashore in the soil of a manor the lord was entitled to take the best anchor and cable
was held void and "without consideration"; and Simpson v. Bithwood, 3 Lev. 307, 83 Eng.
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view that such tests are evidence of a determination in the courts to
check what they regard as usurpations, arising either out of attempts
to extend existing customs beyond their proper ambit or to impose completely new burdens upon the weaker party. 62 But the very tests seem
to imply a recognition that something more than the mere consensus
utentium is demanded in order that what they call custom may indeed
acquire the force of law.
If we tum now to a brief consideration of the origin and nature of
borough customs we will find without doubt that their force and validity
rest on more than mere voluntary acceptance, by tacit and long-continued usage on the part of inhabitants of a given place, of a set of rules
governing their relationships inter se. It is true that the forms of pleading required that in alleging borough customs the pleader must say
that "the borough (or city) is an ancient borough (or city) and time out
of mind it hath been used, etc. . . ." 63 But later research suggests that
this statement, so far as it attributes the foundation of the rule to
immemorial usage, is in many instances mere fiction. To begin with,
there is the undoubted fact that the content of many borough custumals
has been derived by sheer imitation of the customs of earlier boroughs. 64
Dr. Allen instances this spread of borough customs as an example of
the force of imitation which, he points out earlier,65 plays a considerable•
part in the creation of custom. But the largely unconscious imitation
which creates a habit of action is one thing, the conscious imitation
exemplified by the deliberate adoption of rules of action followed
Rep. 703 (1702), a similar case, but one in which the custom included a duty on the part
of the lord to succour the shipwrecked etc.; this was held a sufficient consideration. See
also Fermor v. Brooke, Cro. Eliz. 203, 78 Eng. Rep. 459 (1589); Hill v. Hanks, 2 Buist. 201,
80 Eng. Rep. 1066 (1614); 1 BnooKE, ABRIDGEMENT (1573), tit. Customes, pl. 31, citing
21 H. VII, c. 20: a custom that every tenant who distrains damage feasant shall impound in
the lord's park or be amerced held not good, for the lord is not damnilied; similarly of a
custom to forfeit 20d to the lord if the annual dues to the church be not paid; but (per
Pollard) a good custom that tenants of a manor nest to the sea shall not fish unless in the
lord's boat (for which they are presumably to pay a toll) "quar le seygnyour est al charges
in reparation del battell"; ibid. pl. 77, citing 2 R. ill, c. 15; a custom (according to a note
in the margin, called "landbird") in the county of Bucks that if a swan nest on land adjoining the Thames and hatch three cygnets, the owner of the swan shall have the two best
and the owner of the land shall have the other "quar aliter lownour del terre poet ewe mettre
hors."
62 LAw IN THB MAxrnc, 3d ed., Appendix B, "Reasonableness of Custom," 510-522
(1939).
63 See the pleading set forth in extenso in The Case of the City of London, 8 Co.
Rep. 121b, 77 Eng. Rep. 658 (1610).
64 See Ar.LEN, LAW IN THB MAKING, 3d ed., 104-105 (1939) and the references he
cites.
65 Id. at 96-97.
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already by a neighbouring community is surely another. To describe
rules thus deliberately adopted as "customary" does appear again an
unwarranted extension of the meaning of the term "customary law." It
may be argued that it is only the content of the rules which is derived
uno ictu, so to speak; their binding force may still be ascribed to usage
and practice. But here a second accepted fact comes in, namely, that
the great majority of the boroughs took their origin from concessions
granted by the great lords of the realm to their tenants, in imitation of
similar concessions originally granted by the King himself. 66
One salient fact which emerges from a consideration of the origins
of borough customs, then, is this element of concession from one having
authority. But this is not quite all. It seems clear that at the beginning
of what Pollock and Maitland call "the period of charters"67 there were
already over fifty towns in England which since Anglo-Saxon times had
been called boroughs or burhs; towns which, it seems, exhibited at least
some of the characteristics of the later creations, especially the jurisdictional privileges. 68 It is possible then that a proportion of the rules
known as borough customs which spread by the process of imitation
already described could be thought of as originating in the usages of
the inhabitants of one of these original boroughs. But a perusal of the
individual customs collected by Miss Bateson in the two volumes of
Borough Customs edited by her for the Selden Society69 fails to bring
(36 See Miss Bateson's account, in 16 ENGUSH HisTORICAL RBvmw 343 (1901), of the
whole process whereby the lord, in granting such a charter, is "creating among his tenants,
for reasons of policy, a special caste" adding that he was merely doing what the State had
long been doing. "The act of the lord of the twelfth century who creates by charter a
compact and complete entity which is called burgus or liber burgus is purely imitative. It
is a legal act; the words b11rgus, burgagium, burgensis, are already technical terms for
legal conceptions which have a certain definiteness. The lord is granting liberties which
had been distinctive of the burghal character long before the private-borough-maker began
his work. The inquirer into the origin of these legal conceptions must go far behind the
charters here collected in search of his solution of the problem." Dr. Gross, in his work
on the Gild Merchant, has defined for us the commonest privileges which were thus conceded [I THB GILD MERCHANT 6 (1890)]: "the fee-farm rent ••• or commutation of tolls,
court perquisites, and other town dues, belonging to the king or mesne lord, for a fixed
sum of money; exemption from toll throughout the realm; the right to hold markets and
fairs; the election of town officers by the burgesses; the gild merchant; the return of all
writs; and, ultimately, the complete exclusion of the sheriffs and other royal bailiffs from
all interference in the affairs of the borough." See also I PoLLOCK AND MAITLAND, HrsTORY OF ENGUSH LAw 627-652 (1895) for a fuller account of these privileges or franchises.
67 I HISTORY oF ENGUSH LAw 626 (1895).
68 Supra note 66; 1 STUBBS, CoNSTITUTIONAL HisTORY OF ENGLAND 93-94 (1874);
MAln.AND, ToWNsmP AND BoROUGH 41, 74-75 (1898); BATESON, 2 BoRoUGH CusToMs
(21 Selden Society) Introduction, at xx (1906): "..• many traces remain to show that the
borough courts of early origin had control of the 'causae majores,' causes touching life,
freedom, and land." (italics supplied).
69 Vol. 1 (18 Selden Soc.) (1904); Vol. 2 (21 Selden Soc.) (1906).
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to light any customs which fit the pattern of popular custom described
· "the th·mg wh·1ch must b e done. "
ab ove; "the th·mg done" b ecommg
Indeed, these assorted customs, with their emphasis on jurisdiction,
remedies and procedure in both personal and real actions, process and
execution, court rules, and the like, read much more like a compilation
of official and curial customs than a record of popular customs.70 If
usage _amounts to "some actual uniformity of voluntary action" 71 on the
part of all or most of the inhabitants of the borough, then usage is not
the foundation of the binding force of these customs, and the constant
introductory phrase "item usi sumus" 12 loses its meaning from this point
of view.
Something must finally be said about mercantile custom as a source
of rules of the Common Law. The custom of merchants is neither the
custom of the people as a whole nor purely local custom; but as the
custom of a class diffused throughout the whole of England it is clearly
more closely akin to the general custom of the realm;73 and indeed it
has generally been so treated,74 although in early cases we find mercantile customs pleaded as local customs.75 These mercantile customs
appear at first sight much more like a homogeneous body of popular
practice than do any of the other types of custom we have so far reviewed. If we take as typical of the custom of merchants the rule that
if A draw upon B a bill payable to C, B (if he accept the bill) is bound
thereby to pay C, we may readily see expressed in this rule the result
of a long-continued course of practice among merchants; the crux of the
70 Perhaps the extract from the Leges Burgorum, cap. 38 (1 BOROUGH CusTOMS 88)
showing that he who takes geese damage feasant may take their heads and fasten their beaks
in the soil and eat their bodies, comes nearest to being a relic of popular custom. But here
too "the thing done" has become "the thing that may be done."
71 SALMOND, JURISPRUDENCE, 10th ed. by Glanville Williams, 31 (1947).
72 Cf. extract from the customs of Hereford, cap. 92 (1 BOROUGH CuSToMs 3);
also the use of the phrase "Item use est" as in the extract from the custumal of Romney,
cap. 37 (ibid. 16).
73 See Salt, "The Local Ambit of a Custom," CAMBRIDGE LEGAL EssAYS 279 at 287•
288 (1926).
74 See 1 BROOKE, ABRIDGMENT (1573), tit. Custome, pl. 59, citing 34 H. Vill:
"Information in Scaccario vers marchant pur lader vyne in estrange niefe, le defendant plede
lycence le roy fait a J. S. de ceo faire quel J. S. aver graunt son auctoritie inde al defend•
ant et quod habetur co~etudo inter mercatores per totam Angliam que un poet assigne
tyel licence ouster a un autre, et que lassigne enjoyera ceo &c que fuit demurre in ley, et
fuit agree pur Jey, que homme ne poet prescriber custom per totam Angliam car si soyt
per totam Angliam ceo est un commune ley et nemye un custom.••." Cf. Hobart, C.J.,
in Vanheath v. Turner, Winch 24, 124 Eng. Rep. 21 (1657): " •.• the custome of mer•
chants is part of the common law of this kingdome, of which the Judges ought to take
notice.•••" See also 1 Coirn, lNsnTUTEs 182a (1832).
75 E.g. in Oaste v. Taylor, Cro. Jae. 306, 79 Eng. Rep. 262 (1612).
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matter is that acceptors of such bills have in the past customarily acknowledged their liability to pay the payee, though there may be no
privity of contract between them. All that remains to be done is for the
courts to enforce this customary rule by allowing C to succeed in an
action against B.
But again, is the matter quite as simple as it looks? If acceptors of
bills have customarily acknowledged their liability in the past, is not
this because by all acknowledged rules of contract they are bound to A
in any case? Certainly it may be the custom of merchants to make
contracts of this kind; but how can the mere existence of this custom
persuade a court to grant an action to the payee, in contradiction to its
fundamental theories of the law of contract?
We must, it seems, suppose that this custom of merchants is a more
complex affair than appears at first sight; and so it is. The development
of the bill of exchange in the form summarised above owes at least as
much to the theories of lawyers as to the usages of merchants; and the
notion of the direct liability of the acceptor to the payee is the endproduct of a complex process of juristic reasoning on the part of civilian
lawyers.76 What was received into English law under the name of the
custom of merchants was in fact the law which was applied to these
instruments already in the courts of the Continent,77 though, no doubt
to save the face of the common lawyers, it was as a matter of practice
established by the evidence of merchants,78 and not (at any rate not at
first) by reference to the treatises and codes of the civil lawyers. 79
Similar remarks apply to the concept of negotiability;80 Holdsworth
76 See 8 HoLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw 126-146 (1926).
77 Id. at 151. It must not be forgotten that such instruments were known

to the Court
of Admiralty before ever the Common Law courts took cognisance of them; see the examples
of such bills, drawn from the records of that court, in 2 MARsDEN, SELECT PLEAS IN THE
CotmT oF ADMIRALTY (II Selden Soc.) 68, 70, 71 (1897); and see Denaker v. Mason, id.
at 126-127. Cf. also the trying of the negotiability of a bill of exchange by the mayor and
aldermen of London, in accordance with the custom of London, in Burton v. Davy (1437),
3 HALL, SELECT CASES CoNCERNING THE LAW MERCHANT ( 49 Selden Society) 117
(1932).
78 See Hobart, C.J., in Vanheath v. Turner, Winch 24, 124 Eng. Rep. 21 (1657):
"••• if any doubt arise to them about there custome, they may send for the merchants to
know there custome, as they may send for the civillians to know there law..••" See also
Camden v. Cowley, 1 Wm. Bl. 417, 96 Eng. Rep. 237 (1763).
70 Lord Mansfield, however, was prepared to receive such evidence. In Vallezjo v.
Wheeler, Lofft 631 at 639, 98 Eng. Rep. 840 (1774), counsel objected to citation, in a case
involving mercantile law, of the Ordinances of Stockholm, for, he said "they are matter
of positive municipal law of a foreign country, and ought not to bind the decisions of this
Court." Lord Mansfield replied, "It is very proper by way of exposition of the general
law and custom of merchants."
80 8 HOLDSWORTH, A HrsTORY oF ENGLISH LAw 164 (1926).
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points out that the English rules as to bearer bills clearly followed the
continental practice. Indeed, the whole range of mercantile customs
eventually incorporated into the Common Law rests in its origin upon
the practice, including the judicial practice, of a class of men who
formed a community in themselves, transcending national barriers;81
and the so-called customs of merchants are as much a product of legal
reasoning and judicial decision as of popular action. 82
One other point must be made concerning mercantile customs.
Other forms of custom may with some reason claim to be coeval with
the Common Law, if not to precede it as a historical institution. Advocates of the theory of the customary origin of our English law would
assert that such customs are law, and binding on the courts ex necessitate
rei; that the function of the courts is limited to establishing the existence
and genuineness of the custom concemed. 83 But the history of mercantile law shows that this is not the case with mercantile customs. If
we may put the matter very simply, the adoption of mercantile customs
by the common law courts was the product of a deliberate decision
motivated by a desire to extend the jurisdiction of those courts, not by
any belief that the law-creating effect of popular custom compelled them
to apply the rules of the law merchant professed to be ·based on such
custom; and we know that that decision came relatively late in the
history of the law merchant in England. When Hobart, C.J., uttered
the dictum already quoted,84 the operative part of the statement was
not the semi-fictional statement that the custom of merchants was "part
of the common law of this kingdom" but the assertion that the judges
wow.d take notice (by which he does not seem to have meant merely
judicial notice, in the technical sense) of it. Indeed, his first statement
seems to be belied by the later one that the judges, if in doubt, may
send to the merchants to know their custom; for the point of pleading
involved in the doctrine that one may not allege custom throughout the
realm, since it is common law,85 seems to be to exclude evidence of
81 For some account of the merchants' courts see 5 HoLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OP
ENGLISH LAw 63, 68-71, 89, 93-96, 106-113 (1924).
82 It is clear from the account in 8 HoLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OP ENGLISH LAW 159-161

(1926), that the first attempt to incorporate the rights under a bill of exchange as recognized
by the practice of merchants into the Common Law relied upon the pleader's statement of
these rights in terms of the action of assumpsit.
8 3 See e.g. ALLEN, LAw IN THE MA.KING, 3d ed., Excursus A, 146-150 (1939).
84 Supra note 74.
'
85 Ibid.
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matters which are supposed to be peculiarly within the judges' knowledge.86
If we turn tD the famous cases of the nineteenth and twentieth
centuries concerning the attitude of the Common Law courts to mercantile custom, we £nd this fact of deliberate adoption readily deducible
from the decisions, with an interesting suggestion that the courts are
now bound by fundamental principles of the law merchant created by
the courts in the heyday of its reception. In both Crouch v. Credit
Foncier8 1 and Goodwin v. Robarts88 (the most discussed cases) the
point at issue was really a secondary one. 89 Granted that the concept of
the negotiability of certain classes of instruments had become part of
the Common Law, was it now open to the custom of merchants to
extend the classes of instruments which were so negotiable? The first
case said no: negotiability applied only to such instruments as constituted promises to pay money; that was the form in which the courts
adopted the custom of merchants, and by that adoption their successors
were bound. The Court of Exchequer Chamber, in the second case,
said yes: the precedent set by the courts in the days of reception was to
admit all the usage of merchants as to negotiable securities. 90 But in
neither case was the court's reasoning directed to the fact that the
custom, qua custom, might compel them to adopt and accept it. 91
We may indeed see in the history of mercantile custom a reB.ection
of the pattern which we may suppose the history of the general custom
of the realm to have followed. No doubt at some early time the complex
of popular and feudal practices and usages which was in fact,· and not
86 See the dicta of Hobart, C.J., in Day v. Savadge, Hob. 85 at 87, 80 Eng. Rep. 235
(1615).
87 L.R. 8 Q.B. 374 (1873).
ss L.R. IO Ex. 337 (1875).
89 See the remarks of Bigham, J., interpreting the effect of Goodwin v. Robarts, in
Edelstein v. Schuler & Co., [1902] 2 K.B. 144 at 155: " •.• principles do not alter, but old
rules of applying them change, and new rules spring into existence."
oo See Cockburn, C.J., L.R. 10 Ex. 337 at 352 (1875).
91 See the remarks of Kennedy, J., in Bechuanaland Exploration Co. v. London Trading
Bank, Ltd., [1898] 2 Q.B. 658 at 674-675, where he distinguishes between the cases "in
which it is sought (as it ••• was in Goodwin v. Robarts •.•) by virtue of mercantile usage
to annex the incident of negotiability to instruments purporting on the face of them to be
negotiable, but not previously recognised by the Courts-or, in other words, simply to
enlarge the category of negotiable instruments.••" and those "in which it was sought to do
what the judgment of the Exchequer Chamber lays down to be clearly not permissiblenamely, to set up a mercantile usage which involved a defiance or disregard of positive or
settled law, including in the term 'law' such usages as, having been made the subject of
legal decision and having been sanctioned by the Courts, have become by such adoption
part of the common law."
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in name merely, the common custom of the realm, furnished a rich
storehouse of rules and standards and principles from which the judges
might draw the materials to lay down the foundation of fundamental
rules and principles on which the Common Law was built.92 But once
these fundamental rules and principles are established the same habit
of mind which endows popular custom with what authority it possesses
endows them with perpetual life; they become fixed, unalterable, fundamental.93 The general customs of the realm lose their law-creating
force; they can no longer prevail against the fundamental rules which
were their own creation;94 and so, for example, we see in Blundell v.
Catterall95 the institution of private property (itself surely a creature of
custom) upheld as against a common course of action which may quite
reasonably be supposed to be immemorial. But the tradition that the
common law is no other than the common custom of the realm survives
as a fossilised doctrine long after it has ceased to correspond fully with
the facts. Its survival may indeed become a source of embarrassment to
those whose charge it is to lay down the common law; and so, we may
conjecture, the doctrine becomes converted into a rule of pleading whose
object is to prevent the judges, who are repositories of the common
law,96 from possible coercion by evidence of a strong current of popular
usage which they are unwilling to accept.97
The most obvious feature of the decisions on local customs that have
been reviewed is the constant emphasis (in spite of some few dicta to
the contrary) 98 on the possibility that the right claimed by virtue of
immemorial usage may have had a lawful beginning. This may of
course be taken as showing that the courts were unwilling to accord
92 Cf. SALMOND, JurusPRUDENCE, 10th ed. by Glanville Williams, 216-217 (1947);
Au.EN, LAw IN nm MAxmc, 3d ed., 119-121 (1939).
93 For a discussion of this fundamental nature of custom see especially Moh.WAIN,
THE HIGH CouRT o:F PAIU.IA1>mNT AND !Ts SuPREMACY, c. 2 (1910).
94 Cf. in a more limited sphere the remarks of Kennedy, J., cited supra note 91.
95 5 B. & Ald. 268, 106 Eng. Rep. 1190 (1821).
96 Hobart, C.J., in Day v. Savadge, Hob. 85 at 87, 80 Eng. Rep. 235 (1615): "The
Judges of every place are supposed to have knowledge of the laws of the place whereby they
do judge, and to have customaries among them; and therefore in suits in their own Courts
do determine them, as the Judges at the Common Law do in the King's Coutts judge the
general customs of the whole kingdom being the common law."
97 ALLEN, LAW IN THE MAx:rNG, 3d ed., 68 (1939), draws attention to a note to
Hobart's report of Rich v. Kneeland, Hob. 17, 80 Eng. Rep. 168 (1613): "And it was
resolved that, though it was laid as a custom of the realm, yet indeed it is common law."
"The distinction" says Allen, "is not clear, but seems to mean that the rule in question was
not merely one of popular observance but had been sanctioned by the Courts."
98 E.g., by Tindal, C.J., in Lockwood v. Wood, 6 Q.B. 50 at 64, 115 Eng. Rep. 19
(1844).
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anything more than evidentiary effect to such immemorial usage; or it
may be explained (as Jessel, M.R., explains it in Hammerton v.
Honey ),99 as a legal :fiction, invented by the judges for the sole purpose
of giving a legal foundation of origin to long usage. 100 But the truth
appears to lie in neither of these explanations. What the judges appear
to be doing is recognising that popular usage (the usage "time_ out of
mind" which Coke recognised as the essential element of custom)1°1
is in fact only one element of custom. Jessel, M.R., in the judgment
already quoted, expressly points out that custom, in the sense of the
local law, must be distinguished from usage, in the sense of popular
usage,1° 2 (though he goes on to ascribe to usage a merely evidentiary
role). A similar distinction between "usage," the conduct proved and
"custom," the rule of law, was adumbrated :6.ve centuries earlier.103 If
then some other element, besides usage, enters into the formation of
custom, what is it?
To suggest that it is in truth some express grant from the lord, or
the King, or some lost Act of Parliament,1° 4 is to destroy the implication
of the word "custom" entirely. But if we look behind these rather too
simple formulations of the judges to the half-formed theory they express
we shall see that it is the theory that customary popular action needs as
its correlative the action of those whose public or private rights are in
some way affected by the popular action. The usages which go to make
up a customary law are correlative usages; the constant action of the
tenants, claiming their "customary" right by conduct asserting it, together with the continuous usage of the lord in acquiescing in their
99 24 W.R. 603
100 Cf. Pollock,

(1876).
C.B., in Gibson v. Doeg, 2 H. & N. 615 at 623, 157 Eng. Rep. 253
(1857): "It is a maxim of the law of England to give effect to everything which appears to
have been established for a considerable course of time, and to presume that what has been
done was done of right, and not in wrong. That, practically, has caused a series of trespasses
to constitute a right, so that it might be said a right has grown out of proceedings which are
wrongful. But, in truth, it is nothing more than giving effect to notorious and avowed
acquiescence." And Bereford, C.J., in Y.B. 31 Ed. I (Trinity term) Rolls Series ed., p.
265: " ••• vous avez greyniour mester de averer vostre usage par continuance longe etc., le
quel usage est comence encountre la ley..••"
101 See the passage cited supra p. 72.
102 Hammerton v. Honey, 24 W.R. 603 (1876).
103 1 BROOKE, ABRIDGEMENT (1573), tit. Customes, pl. 21, citing 21 E. III., 46;
" •.• chose poet estre use pur le custome que nest le custome in fait." S.C. abridged sub. tit.
Errour, pl. 65. Cf. the point of pleading made in Anon., Moo. 123 (K.B.) 72 Eng. Rep.
481 (1584) " ••• mes est alleage quod quaelibet foemina poterit devisare le quel parol
poterit est parol de justification lou doit estre 1isi sunt devisare• •••" (Italics supplied).
104 See cases cited supra notes 58, 59 and 60.
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claim.105 And so it is with all other customs;106 though the interest
correlative to the popular interest expressed in the usage may vary in
different cases. The "tacito consensu populi" by which the statutes of
Roman law were abrogated107 was made up of at least two elements:
the habit of disobedience on the part of the public at large and the habit
of nonenforcement on the part of the official element in the State. At
times we may find a complex conjunction of acts tending together to
create one customary rule; action on one part, acquiescence on another,
expectation perhaps on the part of a third, enforcement by a fourth
element in the community.108
It is submitted that this theory of custom does furnish a definition
wide enough to embrace the many and various meanings which the
word "custom" is found to bear-the "services and customs" which a
tenant.owes to his overlord;109 the "malae consuetudines" which Henry
I, in his Charter of Liberties, promises to abolish;110 the "graund
custome" which is called subsidy, and the "petit custome' which the
Kings of England inherit;111 the "customs" of boroughs; the ancient
"customs" of inheritance, such as gavelkind112 (to give but a few of the
diverse senses in which this Protean term is used). If we were to try
to put this definition shortly we might say that a custom is simply a
usual or habitual pattern of behaviour in the routine administration of
the affairs of a community subject to some defined jurisdiction. We
cannot particularise further without, it seems, excluding some sense in
105 Cf. Tindal, C.J., in Tyson v. Smith, 9 Ad. & El. 406 at 425, 112 Eng. Rep. 1265
(1838): "The custom, in fact, comes at last to an agreement, which has been evidenced by
such repeated acts of assent on both sides from the earliest times, beginning before time of
memory and continuing down to our own times, that it has become the law of the particular
place."
10s Cf. KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND STATE 34 (1945): "Suppose that, in
a certain community, the following rule is considered valid: A debtor has to pay his creditor
5 per cent interest if there is no other agreement upon this point. Suppose further that this
rule has been established through custom; that over a long period of time creditors have in
fact demanded 5 per cent interest and debtors have in fact paid that amount." (Italics
supplied).
107 Inst. of Justinian 1.2.11; Dig. of Justinian 1.3.32.1.
108 Mercantile custom would seem to furnish a good example of this.
109 See the writ de consuetudinibus et servitiis, FITZHERBERT, NEw NATURA BRBVIUM,
9th ed., 151 (1794).
110 STUBBS, SELECT CHARTERS, 9th ed., 117 (1921). The learned editor tells us (at
158) that in these and similar charters "the meaning of consuetmlo, like our word custom,
must often be understood with reference to pecuniary exactions, especially when qualified
by the word 'malae.'"
111 See 1 BnooKE, ABRIDGEMENT (1573), tit. Customes, pl. 26, citing 9 H, VI, 12.
112 Which Salt, "The Local Ambit of a Custom,'' CAMBRIDGE LEGAL EssAYS 279 at
280 (1926) regards as genuinely ancient·bodies of custom obtaining over an area at once
politically and ethnologically distinct from the Kingdom at large.
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which the word has been used.113 It should be remarked that the relationship of customs to a defined area of jurisdiction is an important
element; and it provides the common element which embraces gavelkind
and other customs which at first sight seem to be merely ratione tenurae;114 for, as Maitland has shown us, with his inimitable charm, jurisdiction (rulership, he calls it) and ownership are inextricably interwoven in the early days of our English law.115
We come finally to a problem which was hinted at in a comment
cited at the beginning of this paper: 116 what is it that happens when a
custom becomes a law? One sees in this an echo of an earlier problerriis a custom law before it has been applied and enforced by the courts?117
Whence comes the binding force of custom in any society which has
progressed beyond a rudimentary stage of organisation to the possession
of courts and other organs for the administration of the law? The only
completely satisfying answer to this seems to be that furnished by Dr.
Kelsen, who points out:1 18 that if customary law is seen to exist side by
side with statutory law, the "constitution" must institute custom as a
law-creating fact; indeed, "it might be due to custom that custom is a
· fact."If£"
· · " we read"fi at o£the sovereign
·"
or constitution
Iaw-creatmg
we can find a tradition of this kind in the history of English law. "According to Hoveden," we are told by Stubbs: 119
"the Conqueror, in the fourth year of his reign, caused an assembly to be held, out of all the counties of the realm, of the men
instructed in the national laws, twelve from each county, who
put on record a body, or custumary, of 39 articles, which are henceforth received as the laws of Edward the Confessor."
11a And even now we may find the word used in senses (involving perhaps a transference of meaning) which lie outside the definition-thus Professor Haskins has shown us
[NoRMAN !NsnrunoNs (1925)] that the term referred also, specifically, to the profits of
justice, and thence, by transference, to jurisdictional rights over certain classes of offences
(pp. 27, 29, 47, 108). Discussing custom as a source of Roman law during the Principate,
Professor Jolowicz says in HISTORICAL lNTRonuCTION TO nm STUDY OF RoMAN LAw 364
(1939): "The fact is that too many different things are included by the different expressions
which we translate 'custom' ••• and too little distinction is drawn between them for us to
formulate rules with any certainty."
114 It would seem [see Neilson, "Custom and the Common Law in Kent," 38 HARv.
L. Rav. 482 (1925)] that to gavelkind tenure in Kent were attributed customs connected with
rights of way (pp. 490491); customs concerning the election of manorial officers (p. 491);
a custom giving the lord the right to cut certain trees (p. 492); even, according to one
account of the matter, a custom of exemption from presentment of Englishry (see the well·
known account in 1 THE EYRE OF KENT, 6 & 7 EnwARD Il (24 Selden Society) 11-12 (1910).
115.ToWNsHIP AND BoROUGH 11-12, 30-31 (1898).
116 Supra note 5.
117 Cf. 1 AusTIN, LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE, 5th ed., 101 et seq. (1885).
118 GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND STATE 126 (1945).
119 LECTURES ON EAlu.Y ENGLISH HISTORY 48 (1906).
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We may observe here that (if there is any foundation of historical fact for
the tradition thus recorded) the Conqueror was adopting (and adapting) a well-known custom among all those who had jurisdictional
powers, that known on the Continent as the "enquete par tourhe."120
Again, when the men of Kent claimed to be exempt from presentation of Englishry, they advanced the plea that William the Conqueror
had granted to the people of Kent that they should keep the same
customs and laws after the Conquest as they had had before it.121
Passing to the acts of later kings, we £.nd as an example of similar under120 For a brief account of this see JENKs, LAW AND Por.rrrcs IN THE MronLE AcEs 23
(1913). Cf. MclLwAIN, THE HmH CouRT 011 PARLIAMENT AND !Ts SuPREMACY 44 (1910):
"As in the local feudal courts we find the customs of the manor, or the special customs of
the district 'declared,' so likewise even in the great feudal central court of the King in his
Council, the customs of the realm were 'declared' also; on one occasion, it is said, by twelve
men upon oath ••• 'nil pretermittentes, nil addentes, nil preuaricando mutantes.' "
121 Supra note 114. The incident presents some interesting features to the student of
custom. After setting forth the Conqueror's grant, Passele as spokesman for the county
claims that Englishzy had never been presented in the county previously to the Conquest.
The blunt reply of the Justices (per Staunton, J.) was that they saw from the rolls of the
last eyre held in the county that Englishry had then been presented in matters of felony;
and so the whole county was put under judgment. See the varying accounts, 1 THE EYRE
011 KENT, 6 & 7 EDWARD II (24 Selden Society) 12, 19, and 57 (1910). Now the learned
editor, commenting upon this, says (Introduction at xxxvi-xxxvii): "It is really interesting
to a student of the growth of tradition to note in how short a time a wholly false tradition
that has not a single fact to support it, a tradition which the smallest amount of serious
inquiry would have disproved at once, becomes to a whole county a matter of such
certainty that they are willing, without the slightest inquiry, to stake an indefinite amount
of their money •.• upon the truth of it. [But] •.• the Knights and Stewards and freeholders of Kent were not unique in their confident ignorance of the custom of their own
county. Their fellows in other counties went just as confidently astray. After all, is it
possible that there was some good reason for their action which escapes us who marvel at it
six hundred years later?" It is difficult to resist the conclusion that Passele's action amounted
to no more than what we should call, colloquially, a "try-on," but a "try-on" inspired by
his (and, no doubt, his colleagues') beliefs as to the nature of custom and the effect of
William's promise to save to the men of Kent their ancient customs. They must have held
those beliefs so strongly as to think that the plea stood a reasonable chance of succeeding.
But the Judges take a different point of view. How can there be a pre-Conquest exemption
from a particular burden or penalty if the burden or penalty was not known before the
Conquest (assuming here that William's ''legislation" on the subject of presentment of
Englishry was not in fact a mere emendation of a previously existing institution introduced by
Canute)? See 1 HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 15 (1922); STUBBS, LECTURES
ON EARLY ENGLISH HrsTORY 52-53 (1906); 1 LmBERMANN, GEsETZE DER ANcELSACHSEN
641-642 (1903). Moreover, the Judges' confident reference to the evidence of the rolls of
the last eyre seems to be an example of the general rule of procedure laid down upon· the
first request on behalf of the people of Kent for confirmation of the "diverse customs •••
which differ from the common law, which they have enjoyed from time inunemorial.• .''namely, that, in the words of Staunton, J., "such of them as we find you have actually
enjoyed and as have also been allowed. in Eyre [italics supplied] we will freely confirm to
you now." 1 THE EYRE OF KENT, 647 Ed. II, 18 (1910); but cf. p. 11 for a different account
of the matter. We seem to see here a reliance upon the custom or practice of the Court, as to
what customs it had allowed in the past, rather than a willingness to accord any inherent validity to the immemorial customs of Kent. Cf. the rule laid down by Ulpianus (Dre. oF J usnNIAN
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takings that the first charter of Stephen122 promises "omnibus baronibus et hominibus meis de Anglia ... omnes bonas leges et bonas consuetudines ... quas habuerunt tempore Regis Edwardi," and the second123
promises that he will observe and prescribe observance of "bonas leges
et antiquas et justas consuetudines, in murdris et placitis et aliis
•
causis
....II
There would seem to be ample evidence in the conduct of successive sovereigns and the models they adopted to substantiate the existence
of a fundamental norm of English law conferring upon custom at a
lower level its law-creating force, a fundamental norm which may
itself be argued to arise.from the custom of sovereigns.124 But if we
are prepared to accept Dr. Kelsen's theory of the hierarchical structure
of a legal system we can trace customary norms at all levels of the structure of English law. For example, we have seen that the lord of one
manor may freely grant to his new tenants by base tenure the "customs"
(or some of them) which similar tenants of a neighbouring manor have
preserved against the overlord who has been imposed upon them.125
We have seen also that the customs of one borough may be copied into
the custumals of a newly-created borough.126 We may say of this that
the source of legal validity of the rule or privilege, the so-called "custom," is the grant of the landowner; hut its content has been built up
by the usage of others of the same class as those who are now to enjoy
the new concession. But we should also see in these facts a custom
( which may itself he a general custom) that tenants by base tenure may
have certain not very exactly defined privileges against their lord (notably the rights of common round which so many of the later disputes as
1, 3, 34): "Cum de consuetudine civitatis vel provinciae confidere quis videtur, primum
quidem illud explorandum arbitror, an etiam contradicto aliquando iudicio consuetudo finnata
sit." The whole of the account provides some interesting suggestions as to the way in which
lawyers of the early fourteenth century were thinking about customs, their origin, proof, establishment and validity.
122 STUBBS, SELECT CHARTERS, 9th ed., 142 (1921).
12s Id. at 143-144.
124 It is true that undertakings such as those just cited were meant to refer to. the
customs obtaining before the Conquest. But no doubt even in those times the familiar
difficulties of proof had already given rise to the presumption that customs which are proved
to have a real part in the life of the community have had an immemorial existence, so that
the judges might (if they were so disposed) rely upon the provisions of these and similar
charters in giving legal authority to all customs so proved. Cf. the dicta in R. v. Joliffe, 2
B. & C. 54, 59, 107 Eng. Rep. 303 (1823); Jenkins v. Harvey, I C. M. & R. 877, 894, 149
Eng. Rep. 1336 (1835); Shephard v. Payne, 16 C.B.N.S. 132, 135, 143 Eng. Rep. 1075
(1864); Corporation of Truro v. Rowe, [1901] 2 K.B. 870, 877.
12° Supra p. 80.
126 Supra pp. 82-83.
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to customary rights have turned) and a similar custo~ that boroughs
shall always have some or most of the general privileges summarised
for us by Dr. Gross.127
One might with some profit c0ntinue such an analysis of the numerous customs which can be traced as operation in our law. It is not proposed to do so here. The main purpose of this paper has been to bring
to lighf the variety of meanings which have been attributed to the
word "custom" and the variety of elements which the courts have sought
for, and the considerations which have influenced them, when they
have been asked to adopt and enforce customs as part of the common
law. But it will not have escaped the reader that the structural analysis
of a system of law in terms of. a hierarchy of norms bears a close affinity
with the feudal structure of England in the period during which the
customary foundations of our law were being laid down. It is suggested
that no consistent theory of the role of custom in English Jaw cati be
built up without adopting both approaches to the problem.
121 Supra

note 66.

